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I. Introduction
In context, corporate law is often credited with creating,
hewing to, or reinforcing a shareholder wealth maximization
norm1: “A business corporation is organized and carried on
*
Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee
College of Law. New York University School of Law, J.D. 1985; Brown
University, A.B. 1982. Work on this paper was funded in part by a summer
research stipend provided by The University of Tennessee College of Law. Like
so many others, I am indebted to Lyman Johnson and David Millon for creating
a rich body of scholarship on which we all can rely and with which we can
engage. This Essay is designed to honor and celebrate that scholarly legacy.
1. A norm may be narrowly defined as “a rule that is neither promulgated
by an official source, such as a court or legislature, nor enforced by the threat of
legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with.” JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 32–33 (2008) (quoting Richard
A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON.
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primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”2 Commentators from
the academy (law and business) and practice (lawyers and judges)
have taken various views on this asserted norm—ranging from
characterizing the norm as nonexistent or oversimplified to
maintaining it as simple fact.3 This Essay contributes to the
ongoing discussion by engaging key components of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm principally as a matter of
firm-level corporate governance—the point at which applicable
corporate governance law theory, policy, and doctrine intersect
with a firm’s organic documents (e.g., for a corporation, its
charter and bylaws) and, more generally, corporate governance
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 365, 365 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This essay uses the term “norm” to signify a dominant or accepted behavioral
standard applicable in a particular context.
See, e.g., Stephen D.
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
(defining norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and
obligations,”); Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law:
Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1174–75 (2006)
(“[D]efin[ing] a norm as a standard of conduct or purported standard of conduct
that (1) is of a type which has existence conditions that refer in some fairly
direct way to facts about human behavior, attitudes, or beliefs, or to some
combination of such facts, and that (2) does in fact exist because the appropriate
existence conditions have been met . . . .”).
2. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (2010) (“Having chosen a
for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting
to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”). I
note at the outset that the text of this essay uses the term “shareholder” rather
than “stockholder” except when quoting from the work of others, even though
Delaware statutory and decisional corporate law generally uses the term
“stockholder.”
3. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 29
(2012) (denying the existence of a pervasive shareholder wealth maximization
norm); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the
Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 45 (2002) (describing the shareholder
wealth maximization norm as “well-established in U.S. corporate law” and
treating it “as given”); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After
Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10–15 (2015) (surveying academic literature on
the shareholder wealth maximization norm and concluding that there is none);
Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its
Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 393–99 (2014)
(describing shareholder wealth maximization as a norm of corporate governance
and an objective of corporate law).
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law practice. Relatively few commentators approach analyses of
the shareholder wealth maximization norm from this perspective.
Much of the debate over a shareholder wealth maximization
norm focuses on theory and policy, while acknowledging and
analyzing legal doctrine. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given the
relationship between legal doctrine and norms in the corporate
law context. Leaving aside governance rules embedded in federal
and state securities law (primarily applicable to publicly traded
companies) and generally applicable common law, state corporate
law—statutory and decisional—directly or indirectly supplies the
legal rules for U.S. corporate governance.4 While corporate law
statutory rules may, in fact, also represent or codify norms,
decisional law often relies on theory and policy to fill gaps in
meaning. Thus, theory and policy may “push” the law in
individual settings one way or another when the issue is
perceived to be one of first impression or otherwise creates legal
uncertainty.
Moreover, much of the existing work on the shareholder
wealth maximization norm focuses on the Delaware law
governing publicly held corporations.5 Again, this is somewhat
4. I write “directly or indirectly” to indicate that corporate law allows for
private ordering through, e.g., corporate charters, bylaws, and shareholder
agreements. See, e.g., Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its
Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 845–
46 (2008).
[M]ore than fifty-five years ago, in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the stock-holders of a
Delaware corporation had broad power to include provisions in the
certificate of incorporation departing from the rules of the common
law and many sections of the DGCL. Indeed, Professor Folk noted
almost forty years ago that “the Delaware corporation enjoys the
broadest grant of power in the English-speaking world to establish
the most appropriate internal organization and structure for the
enterprise.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5. Many authors expressly acknowledge the strength of the shareholder
wealth maximization norm in Delaware judicial opinions or under Delaware
corporate law generally and in the public company context. See, e.g., Stephen
M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1424–25 (1993) (“At
least in Delaware, the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . remains a
more accurate description of the state of the law than any of its competitors.”);
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999) (noting, as one of “two recurring themes
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unremarkable. Delaware enjoys the largest number of
incorporations and most publicly traded companies are organized
under Delaware law, making its law highly significant.6
Critiques of the shareholder wealth maximization norm also
often view corporate governance rules on a generic macro level—
from a broad-based, state-oriented doctrinal viewpoint.7 Yet,
corporate governance also can be viewed from the more narrow
perspective of an individual state’s legal doctrine (i.e., through a
particular state’s legislative and judicial rules only)8 or at the
firm level (taking into account the effects of permitted private
ordering, as well as statutory and decisional law, in a specific
identified firm).9 For practitioners engaged in incorporating new
in the literature: . . . that the primary goal of the public corporation is—or ought
to be—maximizing shareholders' wealth.”); David Millon, Radical Shareholder
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1035–36 (2013) (describing the
relationship between Delaware corporate law and the shareholder wealth
maximization norm).
6. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted
Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 869 (2016) (“Today, 64% of the Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in Delaware, as are more than half of all companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and other major stock
exchanges.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate
Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 75 (2015) (observing that Delaware “can be
thought of as the home of corporate America, with two-thirds of U.S. public
companies being incorporated under Delaware corporate law, with Delaware
courts deciding a large proportion of major corporate law cases, and with courts
in other states often applying Delaware case law”); Johnson & Millon, supra
note 3, at 10 (describing Delaware corporate law as “the most influential body of
law for United States publicly held corporations”).
7. Bernard S.F. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its
Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 391–92 (2015).
8. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where
to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 387–88 (2003) (referencing specific
corporate governance rules under Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts law);
Chancellor William B. Chandler III, Thoughts on the North Dakota Publicly
Traded Corporations Act of 2007, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1051, 1051–57 (2008) (offering
commentary on North Dakota corporate governance and the federalist approach
to corporate law, among other things); see generally Virginia Harper Ho, Team
Production & the Multinational Enterprise, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 499, 506
(2015) (“U.S. state law, whether of Delaware or another state of incorporation,
will only govern the internal affairs of the specific entity incorporated within the
state.”).
9. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of
Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2016) (“The critical
characteristic of the new governance is that it reflects a structural approach to
the balance of power between boards and shareholders. Importantly, this
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firms or modifying the internal governance of existing firms, and
for litigators and judges involved in adjudicating controversies
regarding the same, the private ordering implications of
corporate law at the firm level assume paramount importance.10
Finally, shareholder wealth maximization theory focuses
almost exclusively on financial wealth (i.e., pecuniary gain or
profit), as opposed to other measures of satisfaction or benefit
derived by shareholders from their equity ownership.11 In
addition, decisional law addressing the shareholder wealth
maximization norm typically emphasizes the maximization of
short-term or long-term profit or financial wealth in connection
with an individual decision made by a corporation’s board of
directors.12 Yet, shareholders (in particular, but not exclusively,
structural approach has been implemented through private ordering rather
than regulatory reform.”); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional
Activism A Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG.
174, 225 (2001) (noting that “the benefit of some corporate governance
mechanisms vary with firm-specific characteristics”); Paul Rose, Regulating
Risk by “Strengthening Corporate Governance”, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 11 (2010)
(observing that “‘good’ corporate governance is firm-specific and often based on
qualities, such as corporate culture, that are not readily quantifiable and so are
difficult or impossible to reduce to a set of metrics.”).
10. See generally, e.g., George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance, 41 J.
CORP. L. 609 (2016) (providing an analysis of the validity of corporate
governance private ordering as a matter of corporate law); Joseph A. Grundfest,
The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012); D. Gordon Smith et al.,
Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011)
(extolling the virtues of firm-level corporate governance rule-making through
bylaw provisions); Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U.
L. REV. 485 (2016) (arguing for private ordering with respect to corporate
governance rules relating to shareholder litigation).
11. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of
Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1273, 1282–83 (1991) (“Most academics now believe that shareholder wealth
maximization is the basic pecuniary objective of the modern publicly held
corporation.”).
12. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (“I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights
Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to
maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit
of its stockholders . . . .”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. . . . The discretion of directors . . . does not extend . . .
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.”).
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shareholders in privately held firms) may desire to enhance more
than their financial wealth through their shareholdings, and they
may value individual board decisions that eschew one element of
desired shareholder value in favor of another as long as the
board’s overall management of the firm—through the exercise of
both decision-making and oversight—prioritizes increasing
aggregate shareholder value and benefit.13
In an effort to broaden the conversation about the
shareholder wealth maximization norm in an applied context,
this Essay describes shareholder wealth maximization under
various state laws (in and outside Delaware) as a function of
firm-level corporate governance—corporate law statutes,
decisional law interpreting and filling gaps in that statutory law,
and corporate charter and bylaw provisions—as applicable to
both publicly held and privately held corporations in a variety of
states.14 In this overall context, the Essay considers the
possibility that holders of shares in for-profit corporations may
desire to maximize overall utility in their shareholdings of a
particular firm, rather than merely the financial wealth arising
from those holdings. To accomplish its purpose, the Essay first
briefly and generally addresses shareholder wealth maximization
as a function of applicable statutory and decisional law and as a
matter of private ordering (collecting, synthesizing, and
characterizing, in each case, points made in the extant literature)
before suggesting the broad implications of that analysis for
corporate governance and shareholder wealth maximization and
concluding.

13. See Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value
and the Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 41 (2015)
(noting that “there is strong evidence that shareholders sacrifice their financial
interests to promote their nonfinancial interests. If shareholders do not want
pure profit maximization, the shareholder wealth maximization norm loses
much of its theoretical support”).
14. Delaware law and the ABA’s Model Business Corporation Act are
primary touchstones because of their overall importance to U.S. corporate law.
Moreover, because I am licensed to practice in Tennessee and serve as a
member of the Tennessee Bar Association Business Law Section Executive
Committee, I will cite to and quote from Tennessee law with some significance
throughout the Essay—with more frequency than, but not to the exclusion of,
the law of other states.
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II. Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Matter of Statutory
Corporate Law
Corporate law statutes relate to shareholder wealth
maximization from several different perspectives. The contexts in
which corporate wealth maximization questions arise include
charter provisions on firm-level corporate purpose, director and
officer standards of conduct in managing the business of the
corporation, and stakeholder statutes. The succeeding
paragraphs address each in turn.
State corporate law statutes articulate mandatory and
permissive provisions for inclusion in a corporation’s chartering
document—e.g., a certificate of incorporation in Delaware,
articles of incorporation in most Model Business Corporation Act
(“MBCA”) states, and a charter in Tennessee.15 These provisions
typically constrain corporations to exist for lawful purposes.16 The
most unusual provision I have come across to date in this area of
the law is the California provision on chartered corporate
purpose, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2015) (mandating that the
nature or purposes of the business be stated in the certificate of incorporation);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(2)(A) (2016) (providing that “[t]he charter may
set forth: [p]rovisions not inconsistent with law: . . . [s]tating the purpose or
purposes for which the corporation is organized”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 2.02(b)(2)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006) (stating that “[t]he articles of incorporation
may set forth: . . . provisions not inconsistent with law regarding: the purpose or
purposes for which the corporation is organized . . .”).
16. Delaware law, for example, provides that
The certificate of incorporation shall set forth the nature of the
business or purposes to be conducted or promoted. It shall be
sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes,
that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or
activity for which corporations may be organized under the General
Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts
and activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation, except
for express limitations, if any . . . .
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2015). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-13101(a) (2016) (“Every corporation incorporated under chapters 11–27 of this title
has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited
purpose is set forth in the charter.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2006) (“Every corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of
engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the
articles of incorporation.”).
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The articles of incorporation shall set forth:
(b)(1) The applicable one of the following statements:
(A) The purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful
act or activity for which a corporation may be organized under
the General Corporation Law of California other than the
banking business, the trust company business or the practice
of a profession permitted to be incorporated by the California
Corporations Code; or
(B) The purpose of the corporation is to engage in the
profession of ___ (with the insertion of a profession permitted
to be incorporated by the California Corporations Code) and
any other lawful activities (other than the banking or trust
company business) not prohibited to a corporation engaging in
such profession by applicable laws and regulations. 17

This California statute appears to mandate one of two express
formulations of corporate purpose without allowing any variance
from the form of the statement presented (other than filling in a
blank). California’s corporate law also allows for optional charter
provisions, one of which allows for the charter to include “[a]ny
other provision, not in conflict with law, for the management of
the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation,
including any provision which is required or permitted by this
division to be stated in the bylaws.”18 These state statutory
provisions on corporate charters, even with their differences, do
not mandate or expressly invoke an emphasis on shareholder
wealth maximization or even shareholder value or primacy.
State corporate laws in the United States provide that the
board of directors of the corporation manages or directs the
management of the firm by default (absent charter provisions or
other expressly permitted private ordering to the contrary)19 and
17. CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b)(1) (West 2015).
18. Id.§ 204(d).
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided
in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18101(b) (2016) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority
of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction
of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the charter.”). The
Model Business Corporation Act similarly provides as follows:
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of
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that officers, typically key agents of the firm appointed by the
board of directors, have subsidiary management responsibilities
typically delegated to them by the board or in the corporation’s
bylaws.20 Although the General Corporation Law of the State of
Delaware (DGCL) does not supply express behavioral guidance
applicable to director and officer management activities, the
MBCA and states adopting its framework for their corporate law
do include standards of conduct for directors and officers.21 These
the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs
of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and
subject to the oversight, of its board of directors, subject to any
limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement
authorized under section 7.32.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006).
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2016) (“Every corporation
organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties
as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which
is not inconsistent with the bylaws. . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-18-401(a)
(2016) (“A corporation has the officers described in its bylaws or designated by
its board of directors in accordance with the bylaws. Unless the charter or
bylaws provide otherwise, officers shall be elected or appointed by the board of
directors.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006) (“A
corporation has the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the board of
directors in accordance with the bylaws.”). Tennessee law further provides that
[e]ach officer has the authority and shall perform the duties set forth
in the bylaws or, to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the duties
prescribed by the board of directors or by direction of an officer
authorized by the board of directors to prescribe the duties of other
officers.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-402 (2016). Along the same lines, the Model Business
Corporation Act provides that
[e[ach officer has the authority and shall perform the functions set
forth in the bylaws or, to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the
functions prescribed by the board of directors or by direction of an
officer authorized by the board of directors to prescribe the functions
of other officers.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.41 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006).
21. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301(a) (2016) (“A director shall
discharge all duties as director . . . (1) In good faith; (2) With the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (3) In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.”); id. § 48-18-403(a) (“An officer . . . shall
discharge all duties under that authority: (1) In good faith; (2) With the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (3) In a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the
best interest of the corporation.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2006) (“Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the
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standards prescribe that actions be taken in good faith, with due
care, and in the best interest of the corporation.22 Yet, none of
these statutory frameworks regarding officer and director
management or conduct mention—no less require—management
action in a manner that maximizes shareholder wealth or value
or compels shareholder primacy.23
In fact, a significant number of states have adopted “other
constituency” legislation—statutes that emphasize management’s
ability to consider the effects of corporate action on a variety of
stakeholders. Almost twenty years ago, Professor Gordon Smith
succinctly described the history and then current state of the law
in this regard as follows:
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many corporations adopted
charter amendments allowing managers greater discretion to
consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies in the
context of a corporate takeover. In 1983, Pennsylvania adopted
the first nonshareholder constituency statute, which allowed
managers, “in considering the best interests of the corporation,
to consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers,
and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation are located, and all
other pertinent factors.” Nonshareholder constituency statutes
have now been adopted in over half of the states . . . .24
duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”); id. § 8.42(a)
(“An officer . . . has the duty to act: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care that a
person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances;
and (3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation.”).
22. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
23. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Non-Shareholder Constituency
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 990 (1992) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Interpreting]
(“This is not to say that the statutes codify shareholder wealth maximization as
the sole, or even the principal, guiding norm of corporate decision-making. To
the contrary, the statutes do modify shareholder wealth’s traditional position at
the top of the corporation’s list of priorities.”); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in
Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269,
282 (2013) (“[N]o corporate statute states that a corporation must maximize
profits or shareholder wealth.”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 10
(“Delaware corporate law . . . does not mandate shareholder wealth
maximization. The statute says no such thing.”); Sharfman, supra note 3, at 398
(“Delaware General Corporation Law is silent on shareholder wealth
maximization.”).
24. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
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This aspect of statutory corporate law has changed little since
Professor Smith wrote these words.25 Neither the DGCL nor the
MBCA includes other constituency provisions.26 Although other
constituency statutes do not deny the existence of a shareholder
wealth maximization norm in director and officer action that
complies with applicable fiduciary duties, they do offer corporate
managers some cover in considering the interests of other
stakeholders when they engage in management activities.27
Of course, the lack of positive statutory law dictating
shareholder wealth maximization does not signal the lack of a
norm (as opposed to a doctrinal rule or legal requirement
embedded in director and officer fiduciary duties).28 One could
289 (1998).
25. See Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders
Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 93–98 (2015) (relating the history
and components of constituency statutes throughout the United States).
26. See id. at 97 (“Neither Delaware nor the ABA Model Business
Corporation Act, both leaders in corporate legislation, have adopted nonshareholder constituency language.”).
27. See Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency
Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 787 (“In other words, constituency statutes at least make
clear that a board of directors may consider interests other than those of the
shareholders when making corporate decisions.”).
28. See, e.g., Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business
Judgment
Rule,
(forthcoming
2017)
(manuscript
at
2,
4)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888052 (“The requirement of SWM enters into
corporate law through a Board’s fiduciary duties as applied under the Rule, not
statutory law.”) (on file with author); Smith, supra note 24, at 290 (“Even if the
shareholder primacy norm is unenforceable as a rule of law, it still may
influence corporate decision making. As noted above, the influence of the
shareholder primacy norm on ordinary business decisions is an empirical
question not susceptible to a ready answer.”). One academic commentator
articulates the strength of a social, rather than legal, shareholder wealth
maximization norm in director conduct:
[E]ven if the strong shareholder wealth-maximization language from
Dodge, the ALI Principles, and eBay do not state enforceable legal
requirements, the principle appears to be a widely shared norm
among corporate directors. That is, even if the revisionists were
correct on the law, it would still be the case that corporate directors
are overwhelmingly primed to pursue shareholder wealth. That norm
is prevalent in business schools, law schools, corporate social circles,
and corporate boardrooms. Even the most ardent critics of the norm,
moreover, acknowledge its prevalence in U.S. businesses. Corporate
directors, in other words, are taught to believe in both the legal
requirement and the normative desirability of shareholder wealth-
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argue that benefit corporation statutes, which typically do not
permit the corporation’s board to prioritize shareholder wealth
over other corporate interests, have become popular largely
because of concern that a shareholder wealth maximization norm
does exist (even in states with other constituency statutes) or
may interfere with the board’s ability to consider corporate
interests other than the enhancement of shareholder financial
wealth.29 Decisional law offers some evidence of why this concern
about a norm exists, even if the evidence may not permit a form
conclusion that the norm has been codified as legal doctrine.30
III. Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Matter of Decisional
Law
The list of judicial decisions that support corporate
shareholder wealth maximization is short and has been well trod
in the literature. Typically, summaries of the court opinions in
this area begin with the iconic early twentieth-century Michigan
maximization. These social norms can be at least as powerful an
influence on director behavior as legal doctrine, and they have had an
enormous impact on the way that directors view their role within
corporations.
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1598–
99 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
29. See William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit
Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 838 (2012) (“[B]enefit corporation statutes . . . address
not only the need for a new corporate form that changes the paradigm of
shareholder primacy, but also respond to the demand . . . for a corporate form
that meets the needs and expectations of increasingly socially and
environmentally conscious consumers, investors, and entrepreneurs.”); Joan
MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding for-Profit Social
Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 302–04 (2013) (observing that benefit
corporations and other social enterprise forms of entity are, in part, a reaction to
the shareholder wealth maximization norm); J. Haskell Murray, Defending
Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 485, 489 (2013) [hereinafter Murray, Defending Patagonia] (“According
to their proponents, the benefit corporation statutes combat the shareholder
wealth maximization norm that they claim is mandated by traditional corporate
law.”); Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American
Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381, 386 (2016) (“Benefit corporations are a
contemporary effort to permit other participants to limit the reach of
shareholder primacy in corporations.”).
30. See generally infra Part III.
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case Dodge v. Ford Motor Company31 and extend through eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,32 sometimes stopping along
the way to note other cases, including Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc.33 and its progeny, and perhaps another
case or two, like Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.34 Observers often cite
to the judicial opinions in these cases to support the existence of a
shareholder wealth maximization norm.35 Rather than re-telling
the entire story of these court opinions, this Essay notes a few
salient observations about them as embodiments of a possible
legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.
A number of prominent commentators acknowledge that
none of this decisional law—not even the seminal, foundational
Dodge opinion—substantiates an enforceable, judicially imposed
legal obligation to maximize shareholder financial wealth in
ordinary-course decision-making.36 As Professor Lyman Johnson
31. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). In a recent article, Professor George
Mocsary notes that “Dodge’s view of shareholders as the corporation’s residual
claimants to whom the directors owe a duty of wealth maximization was a
succinct restatement of the preceding several decades of Michigan common law.
George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1319,
1344 (2016).
32. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). Despite the fact that the eBay opinion is a
trial court opinion un-reviewed by an appellate court, it has assumed
exceptional significance in contemporary conceptions of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm under Delaware law because it is one of few recent cases to
address director decision making in that context.
33. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
34. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. 1986). Another recent Delaware court opinion
reference the primacy of shareholder interests and the preservation of corporate
value for shareholders without enunciating or applying a shareholder wealth
maximization norm. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36
(Del. Ch. 2013) (“When exercising their statutory responsibility, the standard of
conduct requires that directors seek ‘to promote the value of the corporation for
the benefit of its stockholders.’”); id. at 37 (“[D]irectors owe duties to the
corporation for the ultimate benefit of the entity's residual claimants.”).
35. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in
the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 47–48 (2002); Sharfman, supra
note 28, at 31–33; David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 187–94 (2013).
36. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 775 (2005) (“[E]ven Dodge, the high-water mark
for the supposed duty to profit-maximize, indicates that no such enforceable
duty exists.”); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11
(2012) [hereinafter Murray, Choosing] (“Even though they may disagree on why,
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points out, this is unsurprising given the circumscribed role that
the judiciary plays in adjudicating fiduciary duty cases in which
the issue arises:
Judges address only the particular claims and desired relief
that are brought before them. They cannot and do not
mandate that governing officials maximize shareholder
wealth. They can only prohibit them from taking
particularized actions. In Dodge, the plaintiffs sought more
dividends. In eBay, the plaintiffs sought the nullification of
certain anti-takeover measures. Neither plaintiff sought an
injunction or other remedy that would have prohibited
directors from pursuing the criticized business strategy, and
neither the Dodge nor the eBay court altered corporate
strategy. For judges who routinely recite the vaunted business
judgment rule, moreover, one core rationale for which is that
directors, not judges, govern corporations, the granting of such
extraordinary and meddlesome relief would seem quite
unlikely.37

When viewed through this judicial authority lens, one can
understand the observations of scholars and others about the lack
of a coherent legal rule, as well as the paucity of the decisional
law referencing shareholder wealth maximization and the
somewhat scattered, fact-based contexts in which a shareholder
wealth maximization rationale is judicially employed.
Adding to the complexity is some doctrinal confusion—or
perhaps just a lack of clear expression—in decisional law about
the institution or constituencies to which or whom director and
office fiduciary duties are owed. Some decisional law describes
fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and other court opinions
refer to duties owed to the corporation and its shareholders.
Although anecdotal observation reveals that the latter cases may
predominate more in change-of-control settings (where
shareholder value primacy plays a more leading role),38 the
commenters appear to agree that the Dodge court’s ordering of directors to act in
favor of shareholders (in the day-to-day context) is a rare outcome.”); Murray,
Defending Patagonia, supra note 29, at 489 (“In practice, except in a small
handful of cases—Dodge v. Ford, Revlon, and eBay v. Newmark—courts very
rarely enforce shareholder wealth maximization.”).
37. Johnson, supra note 23, at 285–86 (footnotes omitted).
38. See Johnson, supra note 23, 286 (“[O]nly when the demise of the
corporation is at hand or control over its direction shifts away from dispersed
shareholders does stockholder wealth become the sole purpose.”); Murray,
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shareholder beneficiary language also occurs in other settings.39
For example, in a leading case on director fiduciary duties
relating to decisions made in the zone of insolvency, the Delaware
Supreme Court articulated the beneficiary of the duties both
ways in separate parts of its opinion.40 In a recent case involving
a challenge to a merger transaction, Vice Chancellor Travis
Laster explained his understanding of the manner in which a
corporation’s directors may be seen to owe their duties to both the
corporation and its shareholders:
[B]y increasing the value of the corporation, the directors
increase the share of value available for the residual
claimants. Judicial opinions therefore often refer to directors
owing fiduciary duties “to the corporation and its
shareholders.” This formulation captures the foundational
relationship in which directors owe duties to the corporation
for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s residual claimants.
Nevertheless, “stockholders’ best interest must always, within
legal limits, be the end. Other constituencies may be
considered only instrumentally to advance that end.”41

This formulation offers a bit more clarity than most judicial
opinions on the subject, articulating a shareholder primacy
Defending Patagonia, supra note 29, at 489 (noting that “the takeover cases play
a prominent role” in judicial enforcement of a shareholder wealth maximization
norm).
39. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007) (adjudicating a creditor’s right to a
derivative action when a corporation is in the zone of insolvency); Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 509 (resolving a corporate opportunity claim).
40. Compare Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 99, 101 (“It is well established
that . . . directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders [and] . . . must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the
best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”), with
id. at 101 (asserting that “[i]t is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties
to the corporation.”). See also Guth, 5 A.2d at 509–10, referring to “the
principles governing officers and directors of a corporation with respect to their
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders” and affirming that
“[c]orporate officers and directors . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders,” but proceeding with an analysis that
references obligations to the corporation only—“undivided and unselfish loyalty
to the corporation” and “the general rule that demands of an officer or director
the utmost good faith in his relation to the corporation which he represents.”
41. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
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objective as a focus for the directors’ management of the firm as
fiduciaries.
Thus, the cases in most published accounts that directly
address shareholder wealth maximization are a dispersed lot that
address specific facts in markedly different decision-making
contexts in two principal jurisdictions—Michigan42 and
Delaware.43 To derive a single, broadly applicable norm or rule of
law on shareholder wealth maximization from these decisions
likely would be reckless. For instance, other state laws bear some
scrutiny before such a task should be undertaken. I note for
example that a Tennessee Court of Appeals case avers:
As a fiduciary, the officer or director has a strong influence on
how the corporation conducts its affairs, and a correspondingly
strong duty not to conduct those affairs to the unfair detriment
of others, such as minority shareholders or creditors, who also
have legitimate interests in the corporation but lack the power
of the fiduciary.44

Tennessee decisional law (federal and state) also variously states
to what or to whom fiduciary duties are owed.45 Other state law
judicial opinions vary. A New York case provides that “directors
and officers are bound by their duty of undivided and unqualified
loyalty to their corporations, a duty which encompasses good
faith efforts to insure that their personal profit is not at the
expense of their corporations.”46 This seems to be a relatively
consistent formulation in New York decisional law, with a
Westlaw search conducted on December 4, 2016, revealing only
42. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919).
43. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
44. Intertherm, Inc. v. Olympic Homes Sys., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 467, 471
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
45. See, e.g., May v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 387 F. Supp. 2d 770, 779
(W.D. Tenn. 2004) (“[A] director . . . of the corporation must act in good faith and
remain loyal to the corporation and its shareholders.”); State ex rel. Oliver v.
Soc’y for the Pres. of Book of Common Prayer, 693 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tenn. 1985)
(“A director of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its
members or shareholders.”); Franklin Capital Associates, L.P. v. Almost Family,
Inc., 194 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he duty of care required of
directors and officers is to act in good-faith and in the best interest of the
corporation [w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
46. Limmer v. Medallion Grp., Inc., 75 A.D.2d 299, 303 (N.Y. 1980).
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six cases of the sixty-two located (in a search for New York cases
with the term “fiduciary duties” within five words of “to the
corporation”) in which a duty to security holders was mentioned
in addition to a duty to the corporation. The same search
conducted on the same day of California decisional law yielded
more varied results. Of course, unexplored differences in the
underlying statutory law in New York and California may
contribute to these variances.
Finally, it bears noting that most formulations of the
business judgment rule refer to director and officer actions being
taken in the best interest of the corporation. Delaware’s seminal
case in this regard, Aronson v. Lewis,47 is no exception, providing
that the business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”48
Tennessee law is in accord.49 The omission of a reference to the
best interest of shareholders has salience, especially in a
jurisdiction without a decision (like Dodge under Michigan law or
Ebay under Delaware law) that codifies or signals a shareholder
wealth maximization requirement.
Overall, based on the evidence summarized in this part of the
Essay, it would be over-claiming to assert that U.S. state
decisional law—any more than U.S. state statutory law—
articulates a clear, legally enforceable shareholder wealth
maximization norm as a matter of substantive corporate doctrine.
Yet, as Professor Haskell Murray notes:
Despite all of the academic debate, the persistent common
perception seems to be that directorial duties require placing
shareholder wealth at the forefront. The perception may stem
from the pronouncements of courts in Dodge and eBay, from
various academic articles, from education in business and law
schools, and from the popular media. The perception—as the
47. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (overruled in other respects by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)).
48. Id. at 812.
49. See Franklin Capital, 194 S.W.3d at 399–400 (“The business judgment
rule, when it applies, provides ‘a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors [and officers] of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interest of the company.’” (citations omitted)).
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phrase “shareholder wealth maximization norm” suggests—
has arguably risen to the level of a widely recognized and
influential norm.50

That norm, when layered onto statutory and decisional law that
does not foreclose its existence or power, influences the practice of
corporate law in very direct ways. Of course, it impacts the advice
that a lawyer gives to a corporate client when the client’s board is
meeting to engage in decision making or oversight. But a
shareholder wealth maximization norm also impacts choice of
entity, corporate formation, and legal counsel on potential
amendments to corporate organic documents—most especially
corporate charters.51 The next part of the Essay focuses on this
aspect of the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
IV. Shareholder Wealth Management as a Matter of Corporate
Organic Documents
A number of important questions emerge at the intersection
of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the terms and
provisions of corporate organizational documents. Among them
are the following:
 To the extent business promoters or managers desire to
establish or clarify the nature of a corporation’s purpose in
its charter at or after formation in a manner that is
inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization
norm, will that charter provision be legally valid?
 If so, may directors rely on that chartered purpose in
exercising their fiduciary duties to the corporation or will
a court fail to give effect to the charter provision in that
context?
 What role may corporate bylaws (as well as shareholder
50. Murray, Choosing, supra note 36, at 17–18 (footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as
Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 295 (2015)
[D]ecisions such as eBay and Trados . . . are in tension with long-standing
doctrine . . . . As doctrinal innovations, these decisions risk undermining
the utility of the corporate form as a vehicle for maximizing firm value,
potentially inducing investors and entrepreneurs to turn to noncorporate
entities to finance new business enterprises or deterring investment
altogether.
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agreements and publicized board policies) play in
addressing undesired effects of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm in a particular corporation’s
governance?
This part of the Essay undertakes to briefly address these
questions, which interact with each other.
As noted in Part II, state law provisions governing corporate
charters typically allow for a corporation to include in its charter
a statement of corporate purpose as long as that purpose is
lawful.52 Moreover, Part II notes that the authority of the board
of directors to manage the corporation can be modified by
provision in a corporate charter.53 Accordingly, a charter
provision that is inconsistent with the shareholder wealth
maximization norm should be valid unless that provision
establishes an unlawful purpose.54 Is a statement of purpose that
contradicts the shareholder wealth maximization norm lawful?
An easy answer to that question, given the evidence
presented above in Parts II and III, would be that the provision is
lawful because no positive law mandates the shareholder wealth
maximization norm.55 Indeed, there is support for that conclusion
52. Supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text
53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
54. It is worth noting at this juncture that many corporations operating
under general purpose charter provisions explicitly operate in a manner that
may be seen as contradictory to the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1165 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Briscoe,
C.J., dissenting) (observing, after noting the credit given by the majority opinion
to the religious missions of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc., that in
“[t]he certificates of incorporation for both Hobby Lobby and Mardel . . . there is
not a single reference to religion”). Instead, the certificates state simply that
Hobby Lobby and Mardel were created for the purpose of “‘engag[ing] in any
lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the
OKLAHOMA GENERAL CORPORATION ACT.’” Id. See also Jessica Chu, Note, Filling
a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth
Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 173 (2012) (“[A]n analysis of
corporate behavior indicates that corporations with general-purpose statements,
regardless of the state of incorporation, are not restricted to only activities that
maximize shareholder wealth.”).
55. See, e.g., Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate
Objectives, and the Corporate Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 242
n.192 (2015) (“While the shareholder wealth maximization language of eBay
Domestic Holdings is quite strong, nothing in the case expressly rejects the
contractarian argument that this objective is still only a default position that
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in decisional law.56 Professor David Yosifon takes on this issue in
a recently published law review article, citing to that decisional
law (among other things). After expressing his view that
shareholder primacy constitutes a common law rule in Delaware,
Professor Yosifon concludes as follows:
The Delaware common law that has established shareholder
primacy as the default governance rule for business
corporations neither states nor implies any public policy
indicating that the rule should be unalterable by charter
provision. Neither does there seem to be a clearly implied
policy of the General Corporation Law to prohibit alteration of
the shareholder primacy rule in firm governance.57

While this Essay disagrees with Professor Yosifon’s conclusion to
the extent that shareholder primacy compels shareholder wealth
maximization, Professor Yosifon’s assessment on the validity of
private ordering merits credit here.
Moreover, corporations have, in the past (during the takeover
heyday of the mid-1980s), “adopted charter provisions specifying
management’s right to consider the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies.”58 More recently, it was widely publicized that
Google set up a for-profit social business corporation, Google.org,
to conduct activities focused on attaining social objectives rather
than shareholder wealth maximization.59 Having said that,
can be expressly modified by the parties.”).
56. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952) (“[T]he
stockholders of a Delaware corporation may by contract embody in the charter a
provision departing from the rules of the common law, provided that it does not
transgress a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law
or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself.”).
57. David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public
Benefit Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 479 (2017) (footnote
omitted).
58. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 41 (1987); see also Morey W. McDaniel,
Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 442 (1986) (“A few
corporations have . . . amended their articles of incorporation to provide that
directors not only may consider such nonshareholder interests, they shall
consider such interests.”).
59. See, e.g., Leslie Dougherty, Putting Poverty in Museums: Strategies to
Encourage the Creation of the For-Profit Social Business, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 357, 372–73 (2009); see also Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without
Doing Evil to Doing Good Without Handouts: The Google.org Experiment in
Philanthropy, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 89 (2008) (describing Google.org and the
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statements made in legal opinions and by jurists and academics
in secondary resources may cast some doubt on that simple
conclusion, at least under the Delaware law governing public
companies. I note in particular in this regard statements made in
and about eBay by former Delaware Chancellor William B.
Chandler III and in a law review article written by Delaware
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine.
Chancellor Chandler’s commentary in the eBay decision does
not relate specifically to charter amendments, but his remarks
may be read to indicate categorically that there is little room for
private ordering around the shareholder wealth maximization
norm in Delaware corporations that attract outside investment.
Specifically, the Chancellor observes the following in commenting
on the employment by the board of directors of craigslist, Inc. of a
shareholder rights plan (i.e., poison pill) to protect its corporate
culture:
As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an
organization seeking to aid local, national, and global
communities by providing a website for online classifieds that
is largely devoid of monetized elements. Indeed, I personally
appreciate and admire Jim’s and Craig’s desire to be of service
to communities. The corporate form in which craigslist
operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other
stockholders interested in realizing a return on their
investment. Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a
for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted
millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby
eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit
corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form.
Those standards include acting to promote the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after
the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot
accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights
Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and
admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a forprofit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders—no matter whether those stockholders are
individuals of modest means or a corporate titan of online
commerce. If Jim and Craig were the only stockholders
potential accountability problems created by its structure).
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affected by their decisions, then there would be no one to
object. eBay, however, holds a significant stake in craigslist,
and Jim and Craig’s actions affect others besides themselves.60

In a recent symposium, former Chancellor Chandler reaffirmed
and explained his opinion in the eBay case, essentially confirming
that, to avoid liability for a breach of fiduciary duty, “a Delaware
corporate board must place shareholder financial wealth
(whether in the short term or the long term) ahead of any other
value in its decision making.”61
Observers may wonder whether these words from the
Chancellor in and about the eBay opinion can be taken or may be
used to mean that a Delaware corporation must adopt any
corporate policy or initiative that contravenes the shareholder
wealth maximization norm ab initio or with unanimous
shareholder approval. Proponents of the shareholder wealth
maximization expressions in eBay certainly use the specific words
chosen by the Chancellor in that opinion to argue that the
shareholder wealth maximization norm is, if not legal doctrine in
Delaware, entrenched public policy.62 A hostile judicial reaction of
this kind to corporate private ordering is reminiscent of the
judicial reception to shareholder agreements before statutes
60. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch.
2010).
61. Joan Heminway, Berle VIII and a Delaware Law Puzzle, L. PROFESSORS
BLOG
NETWORK
(July
4,
2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/07/berle-viii-and-adelaware-law-puzzle.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Haskell Murray, Thoughts on the
Berle Symposium: Doing Well by Doing Good?, L. PROFESSORS BLOG NETWORK
(July 8, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/07/thoughtson-the-berle-symposium-doing-well-by-doing-good.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Anne Tucker, “Inc.”
Means
Something,
L.
PROFESSORS
BLOG
NETWORK (June 29, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/
06/inc-means-something.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 53 (2008) (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization
norm . . . indisputably is the law in the United States.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3283 (2013) (“To be
sure, the directors are obliged to use their powers toward the end of shareholder
wealth maximization . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 23, at 284 (discussing
Chandler and Strine’s position that directors are under a fiduciary obligation to
promote shareholder wealth); .
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expressly validated them as a means of agreeing around the
directors’ managerial authority over the corporation.63
Chief Justice Strine’s 2015 article in the Wake Forest Law
Review similarly reveals his view that Delaware law includes a
common law shareholder wealth maximization norm.64 After
constructing his argument on the meaning of Delaware’s common
law, the Chief Justice sets out to debunk the views of
commentators who disagree, and in the process addresses the
possibility of a charter amendment that attempts to vary that
common law:
They . . . contend that stockholders are simply one
constituency among many and that the directors are free to
give other interests—such as the workers, consumers, the
environment, and society as a whole—equal or even greater
priority. In so doing, these commentators pretend that
corporate directors do not, under corporate law of the most
important American jurisdiction—Delaware—have to make
stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance
within the limits of their legal discretion. . . . But, the problem
with that argument is that it does not happen to be true; it is
inconsistent with judge-made common law of corporations in
Delaware, as I have described. It may well be the case that a
63. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL
STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 486–98 (3d ed. 2016). Concerns present in
that setting also exist in circumstances involving private ordering around the
shareholder wealth maximization norm:
Corporate statutes have traditionally reflected a desired symmetry,
granting enormous power to the board while imposing corresponding
fiduciary responsibilities of care, loyalty and good faith. However, to
the extent boards of directors are stripped of this power by
shareholders, the power and responsibility symmetry of the public
policy is lost. The board’s power, and hence, control would be usurped
without a corresponding decrease in their fiduciary responsibilities.
Corporate governance, now out of kilter, could inevitably lead to
organizational chaos.
Id. at 486. Shareholder unanimity and special statutory and judicially imposed
rules for close or closely held corporations, as well as general statutory
provisions validating specific kinds of shareholder agreements (e.g., MBCA
§ 7.32), have evolved the law in this area to allow for greater private ordering
than judicial opinions earlier allowed on a consistent basis. See id. at 486–87,
496–98.
64. See Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a
Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
761, 768–81 (2015).
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certificate of incorporation that said that a for-profit
corporation would put other constituencies’ interests on par
with stockholders would, in view of § 101(b), be respected and
supersede the corporate common law. But, in the case of
silence, the idea that directors can subordinate stockholder
interests to other interests of the directors’ choosing is
strained and at odds with the structure of our overall
statute.65

While Chief Justice Strine gives credence to the possibility that a
charter provision could successfully agree around the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, his words are less than certain.
Perhaps he is, in part, reacting to Chancellor Chandler’s strong
language in the eBay decision about the nature of a for-profit firm
in Delaware.
Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s academic work in analyzing
anti-takeover devices and non-shareholder constituency statutes
also casts doubt on the validity of private ordering that displaces
the shareholder wealth maximization norm,66 a norm that he
argues is both the law and circumstantially compelled as an
essential attribute of the for-profit corporation.67 Specifically,
Professor Bainbridge opines on the potential invalidity of “shark
repellents”—in effect, charter-based rejections of the shareholder
wealth maximization norm in response to unsolicited business
combinations—as a form of private ordering involving a
significant alteration of the directors’ fiduciary duties.
[S]tate law arguably does not permit corporate organic
documents to redefine the directors’ fiduciary duties. In
general, a charter amendment may not derogate from common
law rules if doing so conflicts with some settled public policy.
In light of the well-settled shareholder wealth maximization
policy, nonmonetary factors charter amendments therefore
appear vulnerable.68

65. Id. at 782–83 (footnote omitted).
66. See Bainbridge, Interpreting, supra note 23, at 985 (questioning
whether the law permits private ordering in derogation of director fiduciary
duties and other common law rules).
67. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 575–77 (2003) (“[S]hareholder
wealth maximization is not only the law, but also is a basic feature of corporate
ideology.”).
68. See Bainbridge, Interpreting, supra note 23, at 985; see also Sterling v.
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Ultimately, in response to specific proposals in derogation of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, Professor Bainbridge
argues that targeted regulation is the best way to counteract
negative externalities impacting non-shareholder corporate
constituents.69
Two additional factors provide a cause for pause in endorsing
the validity of charter-based private ordering relating to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm. The first is the State of
California’s repeated rejection of a corporate charter provision
that included a social purpose clause, examined by Professor
George Mocsary in a recently published account in the Brigham
Young University Law Review.70 This rejection may be attributed
to California’s distinct approach to corporate purpose clauses
(noted in Part II),71 although California’s corporate statute does
authorize a California corporation to engage in any lawful
purpose.72 Importantly, Professor Mocsary also reports that the
same lawyer who sought to file the California charter provision
unsuccessfully sought a Delaware law opinion “from several
Delaware law firms . . . stating that a charter containing a
distinctly nonwealth purpose would be enforceable,”73 providing
some affirmation of the uncertainty of that matter under
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952) (“[T]he stockholders of a
Delaware corporation may by contract embody in the charter a provision
departing from the rules of the common law, provided that it does not transgress
a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in
the General Corporation Law itself.”).
69. See Bainbridge, supra note 67, at 591. Specifically, he concludes that:
[T]argeted legislative approaches better alleviate the externalities
created by corporate conduct. General welfare laws designed to deter
wrongful corporate conduct through criminal and civil sanctions
imposed on the corporation, its directors, and its senior officers are
more efficient than stakeholderist tweaking of director fiduciary
duties, which by virtue of their inherent ambiguity are a blunt
instrument. Fiduciary duties cannot assure that specific social ills
will be addressed by the boards of the specific corporations that are
creating the problematic externalities.
70. Mocsary, supra note 31, at 1369–70.
71. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
72. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 206 (West 2016) (“Subject to any limitation
contained in the articles and to compliance with any other applicable laws, any
corporation other than a corporation subject to the Banking Law or a
professional corporation may engage in any business activity . . . .”).
73. Mocsary, supra note 31 at 1370
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Delaware corporate law. Professor Mocsary’s additional analysis,
examples, and suggestions for implementation bear significant
attention in this area.74
The second additional factor that may affect the validity of
charter-based private ordering that is determined to be
inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm is
the legislative adoption of benefit corporations and other
statutory forms of social enterprise entity. The justification
afforded to legislatures for these statutes is that they are needed
to provide certainty to directors of for-profit corporations in their
pursuit of social enterprise or other mission-driven objectives.75
Accordingly, legislatures are “sold” on the existence of a
shareholder wealth maximization norm that may not be legal
doctrine but may, by the legislature’s tacit endorsement, become
public policy. A student note states the issue well:
States,
by
creating
benefit
corporations, . . .are . . .
unnecessarily reinforcing current beliefs by establishing a
dichotomy in which there are only two entities: (1) regular
corporations, which cannot take into consideration social
factors and must maximize shareholder wealth; and (2) benefit
corporations, which can take into consideration social factors
and do not have to maximize shareholder wealth. By
establishing this dichotomy, states inadvertently create a
jointly exhaustive pair in which the very existence of benefit
corporations requires that their counterpart, a shareholder
wealth maximizing corporation, exist. In other words, benefit
corporations further reinforce the assumption that
corporations exist only to make money for their
shareholders.76

The only saving grace, although perhaps it provides little comfort,
is that benefit corporation statutes typically include a provision
disclaiming any effect of benefit corporation statutes on the
validity or interpretation of the for-profit corporate law outside
the benefit corporation context.77 This matter is important
74. Id. at 1369–89.
75. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L.
REV. 541, 546–48 (2016) (setting forth the arguments made in a white paper
used to support legislative enactment of benefit corporation legislation).
76. Chu, supra note 54, at 185–86.
77. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 368 (2016) (“This subchapter shall not
affect a statute or rule of law that is applicable to a corporation that is not a
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because many existing social enterprise firms are organized
under the for-profit corporation laws in states adopting benefit
corporation statutes—either because these entities were
incorporated before adoption of the benefit corporation provisions
or because the firms do not want to or cannot by their nature opt
into other aspects of the benefit corporation form. For example,
benefit corporation statutes only cover firms with a corporate
purpose that incorporates the specific types of statutory benefits
listed (most often requiring that the firm have a purpose to
benefit both the environment and society).78 Accordingly, even if
public benefit corporation, except as provided in § 363 of this title.”); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 304A.011 (West 2016) (“The chapter does not affect a statute or
rule of law that applies to a corporation formed under chapter 302A that is not a
public benefit corporation.”). Tennessee law similarly, but more pointedly,
provides in this regard that:
[N]o implication is made by, and no inference may be drawn from, the
enactment of this chapter as to whether, in exercising their duties,
the officers or directors of a domestic business corporation that is not
a for-profit benefit corporation may consider the impact of the
corporation's transactions or other conduct on: (1) The interests of
those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, including the
pecuniary interests of shareholders; or (2) Any public benefit or public
benefits identified in its charter.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-109 (2016).
78. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1702, 1706 (McKinney 2016)
(requiring that “[e]very benefit corporation . . . have a purpose of creating
general public benefit” and defining a general public benefit as “a material
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed
against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit
corporation”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.750, 60.758 (West 2016) (providing that
“a benefit company has the purpose of providing a general public benefit” and
defining a general public benefit as “a material positive impact on society and
the environment, taken as a whole, from the business and operations of a
benefit company”). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 362(a)–(b) (2016) (requiring
a public benefit corporation to “[i]dentify within its statement of business or
purpose . . . 1 or more specific public benefits to be promoted by the corporation”
and setting forth a list of specific public benefits). Tennessee’s corporate law
provides that
[t]he charter of a for-profit benefit corporation shall . . . include a
statement regarding the purpose or purposes for which the
corporation is organized including one (1) or more public benefits to
be pursued by the corporation” and defining a public benefit as “a
positive effect or reduction of negative effects on one (1) or more
categories of persons, entities, communities, or interests, other than
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, including, but not
limited to, an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational,
environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific, or technological
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it otherwise may desire to do so, not every firm that wants to look
beyond shareholder wealth maximization for its corporate
purpose is able to form a benefit corporation or other social
enterprise entity because of statutory restrictions.
The accumulated evidence is at best unclear about whether a
public or private firm incorporated in or outside Delaware can
engage in private ordering in its charter to include a corporate
purpose that may be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with
the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Even assuming that
a charter provision displacing the shareholder wealth
maximization norm were to be determined legally valid as a
matter of the statutory law governing charters and board
management responsibilities, however, it may be found
unenforceable as a matter of public policy in a specific context on
the grounds that the shareholder wealth maximization norm—as
Chancellor Chandler, Chief Justice Strine, and Professor
Bainbridge, among others, assert or acknowledge—represents a
strong public policy underlying corporate law in Delaware.79 The
potential unenforceability of an otherwise valid charter provision
in specific circumstances puts corporate directors in the position
of determining that they must act in an ultra vires manner
(potentially opening themselves up to a legal claim in that regard,
as permitted under applicable law)80 or in bad faith—perhaps by
violating a tacit duty of obedience81—to comply with corporate
law or public policy giving legal effect to the shareholder wealth
maximization norm.
effect.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-103(3), 104(e) (2016).
79. See supra notes 70–80 and accompanying text (summarizing the
arguments of these three commentators on the strong role that the shareholder
wealth maximization norm plays in Delaware law).
80. Modern state corporate law statutes significantly circumscribe legal
actions in this area. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.04(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2006) (limiting legal challenges based on a corporation’s power to act to:
injunction proceedings by shareholders; actions by or on behalf of the
corporation against incumbent or former director, officer, employee, or agent of
the corporation; and enforcement proceedings brought by the state attorney
general).
81. See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty,
55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (2010) (arguing for a revival of a duty of obedience in
for-profit corporate law).
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Given this uncertainty about charter-based private ordering,
prospects for the validity and enforceability of corporate bylaws,
shareholder agreements, and board policies also may be in doubt.
Statutes addressing corporate bylaws generally permit
corporations to make provision in them for internal governance of
the firm as long as the contents are consistent with applicable
law and the corporation’s charter.82 Yet, most statutes do not
allow the management authority of a board of directors to be
varied in the corporate bylaws.83 Shareholder agreements for
firms organized under the close corporation subchapter of the
DGCL or in an MBCA state may do a bit better in agreeing
around the shareholder wealth maximization norm. In each case,
agreements meeting applicable statutory requirements should be
facially valid and enforceable to the same extent as charter
amendments. Statutes validating shareholder agreements
typically allow them to limit or even eliminate the board’s
management authority,84 and the statutory provisions dictating
82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2016) (“The bylaws may contain any
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation,
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees.”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 2016) (“The by-laws may
contain any provision relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of
its affairs, its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its shareholders,
directors or officers, not inconsistent with this chapter or any other statute of
this state or the certificate of incorporation.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-106(b)
(2016) (“The bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision for managing
the business and regulating the affairs of the corporation that is not
inconsistent with law or the charter.”).
83. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350, 351 (2016) (allowing statutory
close corporations to restrict the discretion of directors or provide for
management by the shareholders); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-302(b) (2016)
No written agreement that relates to any phase of the affairs of the
corporation, whether to the management of its business or to the
division of its profits or otherwise, . . . on the ground that it is an
attempt by the parties thereto to restrict the discretion of the board of
directors in its management of the business of the corporation or to
treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their
relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between
partners.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006)
[A]n agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that
complies with this section is effective among the shareholders and the
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board management provide an exception for shareholder
agreements by general reference or express mention.85 Board
policies (adopted by resolution of the directors) contrary to
shareholder wealth maximization would seem to have the least
likely chance of being valid and enforceable because they are not
mandated or expressly recognized or validated under state
corporate law statutes—in general or as potential sources of
varying the board of directors’ authority to manage or direct the
management of the corporation. A board policy, like any other
action taken by a corporate board of directors, may be challenged
on the basis that it violates law or public policy or that it as
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty
Based on the foregoing, efforts to formalize legally valid and
enforceable decision-making guidance for corporate directors—
whether found in the corporation’s charter, bylaws, a shareholder
agreement, or board policy—that contravenes (de facto or de jure)
the shareholder wealth maximization norm may or may not be
successful. Faced with a challenge to firm-level board decision
making that incorporates significant attention to non-shareholder
constituencies or non-wealth maximizing corporate objectives
benefiting or serving shareholders, directors run the risk of
liability for violating a judicial interpretation of positive law
(statutory or decisional) or salient public policy. Existing
commentary suggests that the adjudication of a challenge of this
kind may result in different outcomes based on the pertinent
facts.86 For example, corporations organized under the DGCL
may be treated in a manner that is different from corporations
organized in MBCA-adopting states. In addition, a public
corporation even though it is inconsistent with one or more other
provisions of this Act in that it: (1) eliminates the board of directors
or restricts the discretion or powers of the board of directors; . . . or
(8) otherwise governs the exercise of the corporate powers or the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation or the
relationship among the shareholders, the directors and the
corporation, or among any of them, and is not contrary to public
policy.
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (documenting the statutory
basis for the management authority of the board of directors, including the
exceptions to the grant of authority).
86. See generally Part IV (recognizing the fact-based nature of cases
shareholder wealth maximization objectives).
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company or large privately held corporation may be treated
differently than a statutory close corporation or common law
closely held corporation in which all shareholders have agreed to
the adoption of the guidance. The area is fraught with
uncertainty and unpredictability.
V. Resulting Implications
The description and analysis of corporate statutory and
decisional law and private ordering included in the preceding
parts of this Essay have many implications for corporate law and
practice. At its core, this Essay asks fundamental questions about
the breadth and flexibility of for-profit corporate law in and
outside Delaware. If directors and officers of firms are obligated
to act in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation or
the corporation and its shareholders, what do those obligations
mean in any individual corporation? How much of the content of
that “good faith” and “best interest” requires adherence to a
shareholder wealth maximization norm? How much of that
content can be defined in corporate charters?
A determination of the answers to these questions
necessarily engages debates about ultra vires corporate action
and the potential role of a duty of obedience in guiding board
decision-making.87 One goal of projects focusing on these issues
could be to sort out and optimize the operation of overlapping
legal doctrine as applied to board decision making and oversight
in for-profit firms that desire to organize as corporations but do
not desire to strictly adhere to a shareholder wealth
maximization norm. The oversight aspect of shareholder wealth
maximization is often overlooked entirely in discussions about
corporate management and governance oriented toward the
interests of multiple constituencies88 since legal actions
87. See Palmiter, supra note 81 (discussing the potential role for a duty of
obedience in for-profit corporate law).
88. Cf. Olliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1215
(1984) (discussing firm governance without reference to oversight); William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Watcher, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 129 (2008)
(examining Berle’s position on a multiple constituency system without reference
to oversight).
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challenging specific board decisions have constituted the principle
body of judicial opinions on the shareholder wealth maximization
norm. This understudied aspect of corporate governance deserves
focused attention.
Ambiguities about the legal status and overall nature of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm drive uncertainties in the
law and its application to director decision making that engage
the interests of multiple internal and external corporate
constituencies at the firm level. Is the norm theory, legal
doctrine, public policy, behavioral guidance, a social rule of
conduct, or something else altogether? Resolution of this matter
alone would push analyses further forward. Yet, that resolution is
unlikely to occur in any definitive way without decisive formal
legislative or judicial action.
Moreover, although commentators on the shareholder wealth
maximization norm most often talk about “wealth” without
definition, it is clear that many intend to refer to wealth in its
simple, financial form. Yet some have come to more broadly refer,
at least in some contexts, to more capacious notions of
shareholder primacy as a focus for the directors’ management of
the firm consistent with their fiduciary duties—in other words,
putting shareholder interests, whether they be financial or other,
ahead of the interests of other constituencies in overall decision
making and oversight.89 This notion of shareholder wealth—
really an articulation of shareholder primacy as the objective of
corporate directors and officer fiduciary duties—would include
both financial benefit and other value propositions (more a
matter of shareholder value than shareholder wealth),90
89. A pair of authors note, along these lines, that:
[T]here is strong evidence that shareholders sacrifice their financial
interests to promote their nonfinancial interests. If shareholders do
not want pure profit maximization, the shareholder wealth
maximization norm loses much of its theoretical support. The theory
supporting the norm is largely based on protecting shareholders’
interests. If shareholders care about more than just profits, the
theoretical support for pure profit maximization weakens.
Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the
Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 41–42 (2015) (footnote
omitted).
90. This distinction also has been noted by others:
[S]hareholder wealth maximization is distinct from shareholder value
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presumably as agreed between the shareholders and the firm.
Broader conceptions of shareholder wealth would be more likely
to be realizable in board decision making in privately held firms
and, even more particularly, statutory close or closely held
corporations.
The advent of for-profit social enterprise corporations—and
in particular, the popularity of the benefit corporation—has
altered the character of the conversation on all these matters—
bringing issues to the fore while (at the same time) adding
complexity to both descriptive and analytical accounts. While for
many this complexity may be unwarranted or unwelcomed,91
benefit corporations may be a proving ground for best practices
regarding board processes in managing the interests of multiple
constituencies. For example, litigation involving board decision
making in benefit corporations may help us to develop a better
understanding of optimal board processes that take into account
a more inclusive consideration of constituents. Only time will tell.
VI. Conclusion
Is the existence of a shareholder wealth maximization norm,
then, a simplistic, reductionist account or doctrinal truth? The
evidence to date is inconclusive. No doubt, as Delaware Supreme
Court Chief Justice Leo Strine repeated a number of times at the
maximization. Shareholders may value things other than wealth,
which necessarily implies a balance of interests. When making a
decision, the costs and benefits are calculated for various effects, e.g.,
how will it affect profits, employee happiness or air quality. Under
shareholder value maximization, these outputs are weighed and a
course of action is selected that best improves the shareholders’ total
well-being. Under shareholder wealth maximization, all outputs
except profits are ignored, and the course of action that maximizes
profits is selected. In other words, maximizing for shareholder
interests will reach the same result as shareholder wealth
maximization if and only if the shareholders place zero value on every
consequence but wealth.
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Kennan Khatib, Comment, The Harms of the Benefit
Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 174 (2015) (observing that, “[i]nstead of
wading through the murky waters, advocates of the benefit corporation have
preyed on the fears of social entrepreneurs to help solidify the new corporate
form”).
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symposium at which the ideas for this Essay were presented,
directors cannot “do whatever they want.”92 But the extent to
which directors must observe a shareholder wealth management
norm in their management of the corporation for the short term
and the long term in a fashion consistent with applicable
fiduciary duties remains relatively untested. Moreover, the extent
to which shareholders can limit or otherwise define the existence
and nature of a shareholder wealth maximization norm at the
firm level in a manner that is both valid and enforceable is also
substantially unproven.
Given differences in doctrine and public policy among the
states and variance in that doctrine and public policy among
public, private, and statutory close or closely held corporations
within individual states, answers to these many open questions
are likely to (and should) depend on individualized facts assessed
through the lens of specific statutory and decisional law and
applicable public policy. As a court of equity sitting in the state
that has a clear leadership position in U.S. corporate law, the
Delaware Court of Chancery is likely to be a proving ground for
many of these cases. In this author’s mind, however, there is no
doubt that the Chancery Court’s opinion in the eBay litigation is
not the end of the story in Delaware—or elsewhere.

92. Chief Justice Leo Strine, Address at the Washington and Lee Law
Review Symposium: Corporate Law, Governance, and Purpose: A Tribute to the
Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon (Oct. 21–22, 2016).

